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Keane v. Carolina Freight Carriers 
Corp.: RECOVERY UNDER 
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE 
ALLOWED WHERE CHILD 
HAS NOT REACHED HIS 
TWENTY-SECOND BIRTHDAY 
In Keane v. Carolina Freight Carriers 
Corp., 70 Md. App. 298, 520 A.2d 1142 
( 1987), a case of first impression, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland allowed re-
covery under Maryland's Wrongful Death 
Statute to the parents of a child who had 
passed his twenty-first (21st) birthday but 
had not reached his twenty-second (22nd). 
Gregory Keane, son of Michael E. 
Keane and Catherine Patricia Keane, was 
killed in an automobile accident caused by 
the negligence of Carolina Freight Carriers 
Corporation (Carolina). At the time ofhis 
death Gregory was 21 years, 7 months, 
and 28 days old. 
The jury returned verdicts in favor of 
the Keanes for mental anguish and emo-
tional pain and suffering. Carolina made a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
· verdict, based on the theory that Gregory 
was too old to permit his parents recovery 
under the Wrongful Death Statute. The 
trial court granted the motion and the 
Keanes appealed. 
The Maryland Wrongful Death Statute 
provides in pertinent part: 
Damages zf unmarried child, who is not 
minor, dies. -For the death of an un-
married child, who is not a minor child, 
the damages awarded under subsec-
tion (c) are not limited or restricted by 
the "pecuniary loss" or "pecuniary 
benefit" rule but may include damages 
for mental anguish, emotional pain and 
suffering, loss of society, companion-
ship, comfort, protection, care, atten-
tion, advice, counsel, training or guid-
ance where applicable if: 
( 1) The child is 21 years old or younger; 
or 
(2) A parent contributed 50 percent or 
more of the child's support. 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. Section 
3-904(e) (1984). 
The court of special appeals disagreed 
with the trial court's interpretation of the 
statutory construction of the Wrongful 
Death Statute. "[T]he cardinal rule of con-
struction of a statute is to effectuate the ac-
tual intention of the legislature." Keane, at 
301, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting Schweit-
zer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438, 374 A.2d 
34 7 ( 1977) ). In determining the legislative 
intent the court looked to the language of 
the statute itself. When the language of the 
statute is plain and clear the court will give 
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effect to the statute as it stands. In addi-
tion, "[r]esults that are unreasonable, illog-
ical or inconsistent with common sense 
should be avoided whenever possible con-
sistent with the statutory language." /d. at 
302, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting Schweit-
zer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438-39, 374 
A.2d 347 (1977)). 
The trial court based their interpretation 
of the statute on a line of criminal cases 
and held that since Gregory Keane had 
passed his twenty-first (21st) birthday the 
Keanes could not recover under the statute. 
In so doing, the court erred in that criminal 
cases apply a different set of rules of statu-
tory construction than civil cases, those 
being strict construction in favor of the de-
fendant. In addition, there were numerous 
civil cases on point which the court could 
have looked to for authority. 
The court of special appeals determined 
that since the statute specifically stated it 
covered a child who is not a minor, it was 
"obvious that the legislature intended to 
permit recovery for the death of certain 
unmarried adult children." /d. at 302, 
520 A.2d at 1144. Carolina argued that 
recovery was limited to children under 
twenty-one (21) since the legislature had 
used the age of twenty-one (21) in granting 
rights to individuals in the past, such as 
the right to buy liquor. The court rejected 
this argument because "the clear purpose 
of the statute was to compensate the par-
ents of certain unmarried non-minor chil-
dren even though the children themselves 
are given no legal rights." ld. at 304, 520 
A.2d at 1145. 
In looking at the language of the stat-
ute, the trial court thought that the phrase 
"21 years old or younger" should be inter-
preted as a single entity. The court of spe-
cial appeals concluded that the word "or" 
was a "disjunctive conjunction [which] 
serves to establish a relationship of contrast 
or opposition," and does not alter or limit 
the meaning of the phrase "21 years old." 
/d. at 302, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting In 
Re John R., 41 Md. App. 22, 25, 394 A.2d 
818 (1978)). 
The task then turned to defining what 
was meant by the term "21 years old." The 
court found that the term had a common 
and ordinary meaning. That being; a per-
son is thought of as being a certain age until 
he reaches his next birthday. E.g., Covell v. 
State, 143 Tenn. 571,227 S.W. 41 (1921); 
People v. Cooper, 207 Misc. 845, 143 
N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (1955). Since Gregory 
Keane had not reached his twenty-second 
(22nd) birthday the court ruled he was still 
twenty-one (21) years old under the plain 
and clear meaning of the phrase when he 
was killed. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land in interpreting Maryland's Wrongful 
Death Statute looked to the legislative in-
tent and the plain and clear meaning of the 
statute. Keane makes it clear that parents 
of a non-minor child who has passed his 
twenty-first (21st) birthday but has not 
reached his twenty-second (22nd) birthday 
is considered to be twenty-one (21) years 
old, and the parents may recover for emo-
tional pain and suffering under the Wrong-
ful Death Statute. 
-Adam J. Seve/ 
Colorado v. Bertine: AUTOMOBILE 
INVENTORY EXCEPTION TO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
WARRANT RULE 
In Colorado v. Bertine, 475 U.S. __ , 
107 S. Ct. 738 (1987), the United States 
Supreme Court held that police officers 
may open closed containers while con-
ducting a routine inventory search of an 
impounded vehicle. 
A Boulder City police officer arrested 
Steve Bertine for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol. After Bertine was 
taken into custody and before a tow truck 
arrived to take the car to an impoundment 
lot, another officer conducted an inventory 
search of the van's contents. Directly be-
hind the front seat, the officer found a 
backpack. Inside the backpack the officer 
discovered various containers holding con-
trolled substances, cocaine paraphernalia 
and a large amount of cash. After the in-
ventory was conducted, the van was towed 
to an impoundment lot and the contra-
band was taken to the station. At that time 
Bertine was charged with unlawful posses-
sion of cocaine with the intent to dispense, 
sell and distribute, unlawful possession of 
methaqualone and driving while under the 
influence. 
Prior to his charges on the drug offenses, 
Bertine moved to suppress the evidence 
found during the inventory search on the 
ground that the search of the closed back-
pack and containers exceeded the permis-
sible scope of a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. The state trial court deter-
mined that the search did not violate Her-
tine's right under the Fourth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution. However, the 
court did grant Bertine's motion to sup-
press, holding that the inventory search 
violated the United States Constitution. 
On the State's interlocutory appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed but 
premised its ruling on the United States 
Constitution. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U.S. 753 (1979), United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977). 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
Colorado court's decision holding that the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 
state from proving criminal charges with 
evidence discovered during an inventory 
search. In reaching its decision, the Court 
found the facts of the case to be controlled 
by principles governing inventory searches 
of automobiles and of an arrestee's personal 
effects as set forth in South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)and 11/inoisv. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), rather than 
searches of closed trunks and suitcases con-
ducted solely for the purpose of investigat-
ing criminal conduct. Chadwick, Sanders. 
Inventory searches are not subject to the 
warrant requirement because they are con-
ducted by the government as part of a com-
munity caretaking function, totally divorced 
from the detection, investigation or acqui-
sition of evidence relating to the violation 
of a criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski~ 
413 U.S. 433 (1973). Moreover, neither 
the policies behind the warrant require-
ment nor the concept of probable cause are 
implicated in an inventory search because 
they relate to the detection, investigation 
and acquisition of evidence in a criminal 
procedure. Since no claim was made in 
Bertine that procedures instituted were a 
subterfuge for a criminal investigation, the 
Court's analysis centered upon the reason-
ableness of the routine caretaking functions. 
In order to justify an intrusion on a con-
stitutionally protected right, governmental 
and societal interests must outweigh the 
protected right. Automobile inventory 
searches have been recognized as a means 
of: ( 1) the protection of the owner's prop-
erty while it remains in police custody; 
(2) the protection of the police against 
claims or disputes over lost or stolen prop-
erty and (3) the protection of police from 
potential danger. 475 U.S. at __ , 107 
S.Ct. at 741. 
In Bertine, Chief] ustice Rehnquist found 
that strong governmental interests are 
served by protecting an owner's property 
while the property is in police custody and 
insuring against lost or stolen property. 
Further, the police who were acting in ac-
cordance with standard caretaking proce-
dures did not act in bad faith. 475 U.S. at 
__ , 107 S.Ct. at 742. In his dissent, 
Justice Marshall contended that the search 
was unconstitutional because department 
regulations gave police discretion to choose 
between impounding the van or parking 
and locking it in a public place. But ac-
cording to the majority, the exercise of 
discretion was exercised according to stan-
dardized criteria on the basis of something 
other than suspicion of criminal conduct. 
The dissent, as well as the Supreme Court 
of Colorado, expressed the view that the 
police, before investigating a container, 
should weigh the strength of an individual's 
privacy interest against the possibility that 
the container might serve as a repository 
for valuable items. In addition, the dissent 
maintained that Bertine's expectation of 
privacy in his backpack and its contents out-
weighed the governmental interests since 
the intrusive search had gone into an inti-
mate area of personal affairs. The Court 
rejected these contentions, stating that a 
single function standard is essential to 
guide police officers who have only lim-
ited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the societal and individual inter-
ests evidenced in the specific circumstances 
they confront. See New York v. Belton, 
453 u.s. 454 (1981). 
This case distinguishes constitutional 
inventory searches from unconstitutional 
ones. Bertine also indicates that inventory 
searches will be valid so long as they are 
conducted according to standardized pro-
cedures and on the basis of something other 
than the suspicion of criminal activity. 
Bertine follows a trend of other Supreme 
Court decisions which hold that the legiti-
mate governmental interests outweigh in-
dividual Fourth Amendment interests. 
- William J. Morrison 
California Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n. v. Guerra, Director, 
Department of Fair Employment 
and Housing: STATE MANDATED 
BENEFITS FOR PREGNANT 
EMPLOYEES HELD NOT 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
TITLE Vll 
The United States Supreme Court has 
upheld a California state statute which re-
quires employers to provide female employ-
ees unpaid pregnancy leave of up to four 
months. The employer's original action in 
the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California challenged the 
validity of the statute with respect to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. The court granted 
the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment, stating that the California statute was 
pre-empted by Title VII and was there-
fore "inoperative under the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution." 
33 EPD ,34,227, 34 FEP Cases 562 (1984). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, based on a finding 
that the California statute was neither in-
consistent with nor unlawful under Title 
VII. Rather, the court found the statute 
furthered the goal of equal employment 
opportunity for women. California Federal 
Savings & LoanAss'n. v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 
390 (1985). The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, and in a 6-to-3 decision affirmed 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
Lillian Garland, a receptionist at a Los 
Angeles based savings and loan, lost her 
job after taking three months' pregnancy 
leave. Garland filed a complaint with the 
Department of Fair Employment and 
Housing, which charged the bank with 
violating § 12945(b)(2) of the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T 
CODE ANN.§ l2900et seq. Section 12945 
(b)(2) requires an employer to grant an em-
ployee leave for a reasonable period of time 
on account of pregnancy. The Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission had 
construed this section as providing preg-
nant workers a qualified right to be rein-
stated to the position they held prior to 
their absence. Before the scheduled hear-
ing took place, however, the bank, joined 
by the California Chamber of Commerce 
and a local trade union (both represented 
numerous employers throughout the State 
of California), filed this action in district 
court seeking a declaration that§ 12945(b) 
(2) is inconsistent with and preempted by 
Title VII, and an injunction against its en-
forcement. Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for 
petitioners, but the court of appeals re-
versed. Justice White delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
In concurring with the decision on ap-
peal, Justice Marshall first discussed 
whether the California statute was pre-
empted by Title VII. There are three ways 
in which federal law may supersede state 
law: in express terms; by inference where 
there is no room for supplementary state 
regulation; and when state law conflicts 
with federal law. The Court dismissed the 
first and second alternatives as inap-
plicable to the situation at hand, but con-
cluded that the third basis for preemption 
was at issue in the case herein. Sections 
708 and 1104 are the two sections of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act which the majority 
analyzed with respect to preemption. Be-
cause both sections provide a liberal con-
struction concerning state regulation of 
employment discrimination, the Court 
concluded that Congress recognized the 
importance attached to state antidiscrim-
ination laws and in no way intended to dis-
place them. Therefore, it was held that § 
12945(b)(2) is not pre-empted by Title VII. 
The Court next discussed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which amended Title 
VII with respect to the definition of sex 
discrimination. The Act specifies that sex 
discrimination includes discrimination on 
the basis of pregnancy. The petitioners 
argued that the California statute provides 
"special treatment" for pregnant employees, 
and is therefore rejected by the language 
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